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ABSTRACT

This is a report of a conference held in Bermuda in 1981 to discuss a multilateral approach to disarmament. The conference was an informal, off-the-record exchange of ideas and opinions among 24 diplomats and scholars from 18 countries and two international agencies. Participants considered current disarmament concepts, assessed UN disarmament mechanisms and procedures, and explored new approaches to this issue. Significant highlights of the report include the following recommendations. A summit meeting between the heads of state of the United States and the Soviet Union should be organized as soon as possible, before the end of 1981. Discussions should include a wide range of political issues but principal focus should be on reaching general agreement on the framework of strategic arms limitation and reduction. An international group of experts should be created to determine whether parity in force levels between the Soviet Union and the United States exists. Nations should make stronger commitment to regional arms limitation and disarmament efforts. Existing multilateral disarmament machinery, both deliberative and negotiating mechanisms, needs to be streamlined and better coordinated. Greatly increased educational and public information efforts should be undertaken to build a more effective constituency for arms limitation and disarmament. Independent initiatives and temporary confidence building measures should be undertaken by nations to stimulate disarmament progress. (Author/RM)

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# The Multilateral Disarmament Process

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Sixteenth Conference on the
## United Nations of the Next Decade

Warwick, Bermuda June 21-26, 1981

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# The Multilateral Disarmament Process

The Stanley Foundation
Report of the Sixteenth
United Nations of the Next Decade
Conference
Convened June 21-26, 1981
in Warwick, Bermuda

## Conference Summary

PURPOSE

At this conference, international experts examined the multilateral approach to disarmament. Discussion focused on preparations for the 1982 UN Special Session on Disarmament as well as the longer-range issues of arms limitation and disarmament.

Conference timing and agenda were designed for maximum impact on UN planning. Participants considered current disarmament concepts, assessed UN disarmament mechanisms and procedures, and explored new approaches to this issue.

PARTICIPATION

Twenty-four displomats and scholars from 18 countries and 2 international agencies participated in this five day conference. Each participant had considerable experience in the International organization or foreign service arena. Moreover, the group represented varying areas of specialization in the arms limitation field. This fact, combined with the informal nature of the conference and the many opportunities for personal conversation, produced new insights and perspectives.

SIGNIFICANT HIGHLIGHTS OF RAPPORTEURS' REPORT

1. A summit meeting between the heads of state of the United States and the Soviet Union should be organized as soon as possible and before the end of 1981. Discussions should include a wide range of political issues but principal focus should be on reaching general agreement on the framework of strategic arms limitation and reduction.

2. There should be regular, continuing meetings between high-level policy makers and military leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States, the first of which could be in preparation for the above suggested summit.

3. An international group of experts should be created to determine whether parity in force levels between the Soviet Union and the United States exists.

4. All nations should prepare thoroughly for the 1982 Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSODII). The preparatory Committee should create separate working groups, one dealing with a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and others focusing on a few desarmament items which should receive high priority.

5. Urgent measures are needed to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime includeing: early progress by nuclear weapon states on strategic arms limitation and reduction and a comprehensive nuclear test ban, guaranteed assurances of supply of nuclear materials for peaceful uses by

countries covered under international safeguards, an agreed formula for negative security guarantees for nonnuclear weapon states, strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguards, and careful preparation by all nations for the 1983 conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

6. Nations should make stronger commitment to regional arms limitation and disarmament efforts. High priority should be given to European arms control including long-range theatre nuclear forces, mutual force reductions, and a European disarmament conference. New nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace should be explored in several regions including the Middle East, Africa, and Southern Asia.

7. Existing multilateral disarmament machinery, both deliberative and negotiating mechanisms, needs to be streamlined and better coordinated. The Committee on Disarmament (CD) must improve its operation. It will be especially helpful if the CD can achieve any specific arms control agreement prior to SSOC II.

8. Greatly increased educational and public information efforst should be undertaken to build a more effective constituency for arms limitation and disarmament. The United Nations, national governments, and nongovernmental organizations should give greater emphasis to demonstrating the contribution to arms limitation and disarmament to the security of nations.

9. Independent initiatives and temporary confidence-building measures should be undertaken by nations to stimulate disarmament progress. Such measures (if initiated by the United States and the Soviet Union) could be especially valuable under current internations circumstances.

10. The UN's conciliation capability should be strengthened through creation of a standing conciliation commission or an informal body of distinguished persons who whould be available on a stnadby basis as conciliators.

REPORT

This conference was an informal, off-the-record exchange of ideas and opinions. From the discussion, the rapporteurs prepared their report after the conference. Participants neither reviewed nor approved the report, therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all recommendations, observations, and conclusions.

The rapporteurs have indicated participants' consensus, or lack of consensus, and accpet full responsibility for content. The views contained are not necessarily those of the Stanley Foundation.

The report is distributed in the hope that it will stimulate study, research, and education with respect to the United Nations and its vital role in achieving international peace and a better world. Permission is granted to duplicate or quote any part or all of the material so long as proper acknowledgement is made. Additional copies are available free from the Stanley Foundation.

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# Rapporteurs' Report

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Rapporteurs

THE MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT PROCESS

## Disarmament Stalemate

The participants generally agreed that progress toward arms control and disarmament is nearly nonexistent in the summer of 1981. The fabric of strategic détente appears to be unraveling: the SALT II agreement is all but discarded, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is under attack, a destabilizing militarization of space is beginning, and high-level East-West discussions have yet to commence.

On the multilateral front, progress is also lacking: the nonproliferation regime is under challenge, including the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system; needed agreements on a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) and chemical weapons have not been achieved; stabilization of contentious areas in Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa through regional arms limitation agreements has not been accomplished; and there are almost no limitations on transfers of conventional weapons.

Since the United Nations' First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD I) in 1978 the only substantial achievements have been agreement on a treaty dealing with inhumane and indiscriminate conventional weapons and the drafting of the main elements of a radiological weapons treaty.

Lack of disarmament progress is paralleled by vast increase in conventional and nuclear armaments of many nations. The modernization and qualitative improvements in strategic weapons raise concerns of a pre-emptive first strike and threaten deterrence. By reliable estimates, nations are currently spending over $600 billion annually on weapons and armed forces.

Participants observed that at no time since World War II has there ever been a greater need for rapid disarmament progress. However, in the view of some, there is also a strong disillusionment in many nations with the failure to achieve meaningful disarmament results. Some perceive a great need to reassess current approaches.

Others emphasized that some very significant arms limitation agreements have been achieved in the last 20 years including the Limited Test Ban Agreement, Treaty of Tlatelolco, the NPT, and the SALT I agreements. Care must be taken not to endanger these agreements, but rather to build on their foundation in the light of current realities.

Most participants believed the impasse in strategic nuclear arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union is the principal factor paralyzing all disarmament progress. Views differed

as to the causes of the current impasse and the measures needed to achieve new breakthroughs. Most participants supported the view that neither country is likely to achieve "superiority" in force levels over the other and that "parity" is the only rational objective given the magnitude of destructive power involved. Moreover, there will be asymmetries in the components of each nation's military force levels, responding to their differing security circumstances, although overall force levels should be at parity.

Some participants urged that attention be given to each nation's *perception* of parity and the need to establish clear and mutually acceptable data on respective force levels. Only on this basis, it was believed, could the current situation be stabilized and significant progress initiated on nuclear arms limitation and reduction efforts. The creation of a respected international group of experts to study US and Soviet force levels was suggested by some. The group's objective would be to determine whether parity in force levels does exist. The results could possibly contribute to the needed breakthrough of the current impasse.

The Soviet-US disarmament stalemate has unfortunately been projected into multilateral disarmament fora and is prejudicing results. Many participants observed that past progress in multilateral disarmament fora has come as a result of agreement between the two superpowers and that the current breakdown in the SALT process has paralyzed many other efforts. Moreover, the lack of bilateral progress is threatening to undercut areas where significant multilateral progress has been achieved, including the Law of the Sea and peaceful uses of outer space. Both the near-term consequences and long-term implications of superpower impasse grow more serious with prolongation.

Some participants argued that multilateral disarmament efforts should not depend only on improving relations between the two superpowers and urged that other efforts must continue. However, the two major nuclear weapon states do create the primary negotiating environment in which all other effort must proceed.

Most participants believed that the current impasse is so serious as to require dramatic new initiatives. Four interrelated proposals received wide support:

1. A summit meeting between the heads of state of the United States and the Soviet Union. Participants appreciated the dangers of summit diplomacy including exaggerated expectations of success and over-reaction in the event of failure. However, it was believed that with careful and complete preparations based on a realistic assessment of national security goals, the probability of useful results from such a meeting is high. It was suggested that discussions focus on a wide range of political issues, but that the principal focus should be on reaching general agreement on the framework of strategic arms limitation and reduction. Such a meeting should occur as soon as possible and preferably before the end of 1981. Some participants suggested that the summit meeting be held in conjunction with a special Security Council meeting to be attended by heads of state, but others questioned whether this would be the most effective forum at this time.

2. Regular meetings between high-level policy makers and military leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States. The first of these meetings could be in preparation for the above suggested summit.

3. Independent confidence-building measures and initiatives by the United States and the Soviet Union. These measures might include a temporary moratorium on below-ground nuclear testing and temporary deferral of deployment of a major new weapons system such as antisatellite or long-range theatre weapons. Both governments should be asked to consider all steps they could safely take to improve the climate, including action before the summit meeting.

4. Creation of an international group of experts to study parity in force levels of the Soviet Union and the United States, as suggested above.

## Second Special Session on Disarmament[1]

The participants discussed the UN General Assembly's Second Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD II) to be held in 1982. After a brief review of preparations for the Second Special Session and the work of its Preparatory Committee, particular attention was given to the objectives and priorities of SSOD II and possible ways to increase the likelihood of its success.

Many participants emphasized that SSOD II provides an opportunity to break through present barriers and stimulate action toward disarmament, but that the risk of failure is high. Some participants said that the Second Special Session will have a major effect in determining whether the United Nations has a credible future role is disarmament.

### General Objectives of SSOD II

There was broad agreement that SSOD II must move beyond what was done at the First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. The Second Special Session should set the stage for early and constructive action rather than merely producing another document.

There was apparent consensus that the Second Special Session should be planned and conducted in ways that will help to achieve these objectives:

1. To increase awareness, both public and governmental, of the need to halt and reverse the arms race and the urgency of progress toward dis-

armament. This should include showing why arms control and reduction are necessary to enable nations and their peoples to have greater security and achieve their economic and development goals.

2. To build active support, both public and governmental, for specific arms control and reduction measures, and for implementing the commitments already made in the Final Document of the First Special Session.

3. To enlarge the constituency for disarmament by actively involving more governmental leaders, citizens, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

4. To increase the number, intensity, and effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on specific agreements for arms control and reduction, both nuclear and conventional.

5. To improve the climate for progress toward disarmament. SSOD II should seek ways to remove barriers to the needed specific measures.

6. To encourage and stimulate the settlement of international disputes, taking into account national security needs, the principles of the UN Charter, and resolutions of the General Assembly.

**Priorities for SSOD II**

There was not complete agreement on how the Second Special Session and its Preparatory Committee should allocate time among general review, disarmament machinery, the proposed Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD), and specific disarmament measures.

It was noted that the Final Document of the First Special Session requires SSOD II to review implementation progress, review the multilateral disarmament machinery, and adopt a CPD.

Some participants believed that the agenda for SSOD II will necessarily be broad and general. Others recommended that SSOD II focus on a limited number of specific disarmament measures in an effort to build greater support or find new approaches that will lead to action within the next few years.

*General Review*

Most participants agreed that SSOD II should review compliance with the Final Document of the First Special Session, and especially its Programme of Action, but should not attempt to revise that document. The goal of this review should be to develop ideas that will help the world move forward, not to find fault with past actions.

Some participants said that SSOD II should establish basic principles of disarmament, identify the root causes of the lack of progress, and specify the responsibilities of the various categories of states for future action. Others feared that some of these questions would lead to polemics and repetition of past sterile debates.

Many participants urged that the Second Special Session minimize general debate and drafting of general statements, and concentrate on positive steps to get the disarmament process moving again.

*Disarmament Machinery*

Participants made many suggestions for improvements in multilateral disarmament machinery or its functioning. (See page 33, Multilateral Disarmament Machinery.)

Some participants said that a review of the effectiveness of all UN-related disarmament bodies and activities should be a high priority function of SSOD II. However, many participants believed that this review should have a relatively low priority. Most participants agreed that in view of the substantial work done in this area during the First Special Session, there should be less emphasis on disarmament machinery during SSOD II.

*Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament*

Two distinct views were expressed on the proposed CPD which is being drafted by a working group of the Committee on Disarmament (CD).

Some participants viewed the CPD as the centerpiece of SSOD II, providing both a sound long-term plan and a time schedule for future disarmament efforts. Others believed that the value of the CPD will be

limited that it is impossible to know now which disarmament measures will be most ripe for agreement in future years, and that concentration on the CPD will divert attention from specific steps to check and reverse the arms race.

There was also disagreement on whether the CPD should include a time schedule. Some participants said that target dates stimulate action and have been useful in some European negotiations. They said the CPD should include a list of disarmament proposals to be negotiated, the forum in which the negotiations are to be done, a beginning date, and an estimated time period for completion, with a provision for review at the end of that period.

Others said that target dates are seldom if ever met and lead to frustration. They were concerned that a CPD may be inflexible, and that it is difficult to estimate how fast the various negotiations can move. They suggested that it will be more productive to work with a list of needed disarmament measures and seize all opportunities to negotiate anything on the list.

Some participants urged that the CPD should include parallel progress in peaceful settlement of disputes and in building UN and regional security and peacekeeping capability. They suggested that this comprehensive approach is essential because nations will not feel safe in reducing armaments unless they can increasingly rely for their security on international institutions and agreements.

Many participants emphasized that the first stage of the CPD is the most important and should receive the most attention. They suggested that a CPD in 1982 need not be a plan for general and complete disarmament, and that its focus should be on achieving greater security at lower levels of armaments.

*Specific Disarmament Priorities*

Many participants urged that the Second Special Session focus on a limited number of high priority disarmament measures. SSOD II will not be a negotiating body, but it should discuss a few important specific measures and seek new approaches and ways to aid progress in negotiating agreements. A limited list is more likely to be achieved.

Some participants, while agreeing on the need for a near-term priority list, emphasized that it must be flexible and there must be a readiness to move rapidly when any area becomes ripe for negotiations and agreement.

The priority list should include important measures which are realistically achievable in the next few years. A measure may be important because it helps to limit or reverse the arms race, reduces the risk of war, or improves the climate for disarmament progress. Some measures should be on the priority list as holding operations, to preserve an existing agreement (e.g., the NPT or ABM treaty) or to prevent a situation from getting worse.

Many participants urged that high priority be given to preventing any irreversible escalation of the arms race. Particular attention should be given to new weapons systems which, after being produced or developed, could not be effectively controlled because of the difficulty of adequate verification or safeguards.

The participants suggested various priority items for SSOD II. The conference did not attempt to agree on a list. However, most participants recommended the following measures as high priority items for SSOD II and for the first stage of a CPD:

1. Strategic nuclear arms control, including qualitative and quantitative limitations and reductions of nuclear weapons. Some participants urged consideration of the bold proposal by George Kennan for a 50 percent reduction in nuclear weapons, a freeze on introduction of new or improved nuclear weapons, or other measures. There was broad agreement on the urgency of resuming, before SSOD II, both the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks and the negotiations for an agreement limiting long-range theatre nuclear forces (TNF) in Europe.
2. A comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement, as part of the strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. (See page 24, Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime, point 4.)

3. Negative security guarantees by nuclear weapon states to nonnuclear weapon states. (See page 24, Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime, point 5.)
4. A radiological weapons treaty. (See page 36, Radiological weapons.)
5. A chemical weapons treaty. (See page 35, Chemical weapons agreement.)
6. Regional agreements to control, limit and reduce conventional weapons, forces, and expenditures.

Many participants recommended additional measures for the priority list, though these were mentioned less often for this purpose than the above six proposals:

1. Universal adherence to, and strengthening of, the nonproliferation regime of which the NPT is a part. (See page 21, Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Multilateral Process.)
2. Assurance that the ABM treaty will continue in force.
3. Cessation of production of nuclear weapons or of fissionable material suitable for weapons production.
4. Additional nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs), zones of peace, or similar zones, and strengthening the existing zones in Latin America and Antarctica. (See page 30, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Zones of Peace.)
5. Further measures to prevent militarization of outer space. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from being placed in fixed orbit, but new space weapon systems are being developed. As a first step many participants urged an antisatellite (ASAT) agreement prohibiting attacks on satellites and restricting the testing and development of antisatellite weapons.
6. Measures to ensure compliance with and verification of arms control agreements, possibly including a UN verification capability and agreed procedures to resolve ambiguities or differing in-

terpretations of agreements. (See page 45, Other Confidence-Building Measures.)

7. Other confidence-building measures, such as shared information and standardized reporting of arms and force levels, military budgets, maneuvers, troop movements, etc. (See page 45, Other Confidence-Building Measures.)

Most participants believed that at least some progress can and should be made on several of the priority items before SSOD II. Some said that final agreements on one or more of these priorities can and should be reached before SSOD II. (See page 35, Negotiating Body: Committee on Disarmament.)

**Reconciliation of Broad and Specific Approaches**

The discussions during the conference indicated several ways in which some of the differing views reported above may be harmonized:

1. SSOD II need not choose between a CPD and emphasis on specific disarmament proposals. It was suggested that both SSOD II and its Preparatory Committee should organize separate working groups: one for the CPD, and several to deal with specific measures on the priority list.

2. There are similarities between a short list of high priority disarmament measures and the first stage of a CPD. Many participants emphasized that the first stage, including priorities for the next few years, is the most important part of the CPD and should receive the most time and effort.

3. Target dates for disarmament progress are more likely to be accepted and taken seriously if they are flexible and realistic.

**Ways to Increase the Likelihood of Success of SSOD II**

Participants suggested several actions which would help to make the Second Special Session constructive and productive:

1. Completion of any specific disarmament agreement before SSOD II would be of great benefit. Negative security guarantees and a radiological weapons treaty were mentioned as possibilities. Also, any significant progress toward an agree-

ment (e.g., CTB or chemical weapons) would be helpful. (See page 35, Negotiating Body: Committee on Disarmament.)

2. Any new or resumed negotiations, bilateral or multilateral, beginning before SSOD II, would improve the climate. Resumption of SALT and European TNF negotiations, agreement to hold a European disarmament conference, or creation of a CD working group on a CTB to supplement the trilateral negotiations, were suggested as important steps.

3. Adherence by additional nations to the NPT and other existing arms control treaties would be especially helpful if announced before or during SSOD II.

4. Progress toward settling any of the current international disputes, or reduction of tension in any area, would aid the work of SSOD II.

5. Thorough and early preparation for SSOD II is needed. This preparation should include the Preparatory Committee, many UN agencies and organs, national governments, groups of states, NGOs, and research institutes.[2]

6. An expanded role for NGOs and research institutes in SSOD II and preparations for it would be helpful.[3]

7. Members of parliament from as many nations as possible should be involved in SSOD II. Inclusion of parliamentarians in national delegations, a concurrent meeting of parliamentarians during SSOD II, and opportunities for them to make presentations were suggested.

8. The climate within SSOD II is highly important. All nations should instruct their representatives to avoid polemics, unrealistic exhortations, and unnecessary rhetoric. The attitudes of problem solving and seeking constructive new approaches were very helpful during this conference and are needed in SSOD II.

## Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Multilateral Process[4]

### Nonproliferation Principles

The Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 stated that "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern", a view shared by all participants in this conference. There is wide international consensus in favor of non-proliferation, as evidenced by support of international agreements including the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Tlatelolco Treaty. Additional nuclear weapon states may exacerbate regional security issues, complicate the strategic nuclear picture, and increase the possibility of accidental or deliberate use of nuclear weapons. A strengthened and effective nonproliferation regime was therefore recommended as an important item for consideration by the 1982 Second Special Session on Disarmament. Certain general principles were identified by many participants as important to a successful and acceptable nonproliferation regime:

1. Both vertical proliferation – qualitative and quantitative increase in nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states – and horizontal proliferation – the spread of nuclear weapons to more nations – are serious dangers. Both problems must be resolved concurrently.

2. Nonproliferation progress must not prejudice nations' development of the peaceful uses of nuclear

energy or cooperation among nations for peaceful uses.

3. Nonproliferation progress can best be achieved through multilateral cooperative efforts rather than unilateral or bilateral actions.

**NPT and Second Review Conference**

Most participants viewed the NPT as the heart of the nonproliferation regime and one of the most important international arms control agreements. Its important attributes include widespread international support (currently 113 parties), the fact that no party has violated its provisions or withdrawn, and the IAEA safeguards which result from the agreement. The treaty has also contributed to stabilization of certain regional situations, particularly in Europe.

Many participants stressed the importance of NPT parties complying with *all* treaty obligations. These include Articles I-III by which all parties pledge to take no action contrary to the goal of nonproliferation, Article IV which provides for making the peaceful uses of nuclear energy available to all nations, and Article VI which requires nuclear weapon states to negotiate and make progress on nuclear arms reduction. There were differences among participants as to the relative priority of these treaty requirements, but a shared appreciation that compliance with all of these interrelated obligations is very important to the future efficacy of the NPT.

A principal weakness of the NPT, in the view of some participants, is the fact that some 12 nations nearing the ability to develop nuclear weapons have chosen not to become parties. Among the disincentives to NPT adherence is the fact that nonparties (not covered by full-scope safeguards) have received equal or even preferential access to peaceful nuclear material and equipment, relative to NPT parties. Another reason cited by some is the unequal nature of the requirements whereby, in practice, nuclear weapon states have been subject to no restrictions while nonnuclear weapon states are asked to abstain permanently from a weapons option. In this view, the NPT will not be a desirable agreement unless significant progress on

nuclear arms limitation and reduction is achieved and NPT parties are placed in an equal or advantageous position regarding access to nuclear material and equipment.

Some participants said that opposition to the NPT in some nations is based on a variety of motives including regional rivalries, prestige factors, and a desire to maintain the option to develop nuclear weapons. It was suggested that lack of progress on Article IV and VI requirements provides a rationale to avoid NPT adherence. However, most participants believed nuclear weapon states set the pace for the nuclear arms race and create an international environment which complicates all nonproliferation efforts. The failure of the Second NPT Review Conference (August 1980), which adjourned without an agreed final document, may have further undermined the NPT. Most participants believed that the lack of progress on Article VI and only minimal progress on Article IV requirements were the principal reasons for the conference's failure. Lack of progress in this area appears to be weakening the support for Articles I-III. Some participants stressed the need to remind nonnuclear weapon states that the NPT is in their own security interest and this benefit should not be lost because of disappointment with the superpowers' lack of progress.

**Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime**

Participants observed that other recent events have weakened the nonproliferation regime and threaten the future of the NPT. The principal example was the attack by Israel (a nonparty to the NPT) on a reactor in Iraq (an NPT party) covered under IAEA safeguards. As a result of this action, questions have been raised as to whether an NPT party was systematically planning to violate its obligations, whether it was being assisted by supplier nations committed to the goals of the NPT, and whether IAEA safeguards were effective in this situation. Public statements by some NPT parties, questioning the value of NPT adherence as a deterrent to nuclear weapons development, have further undercut the agreement.

The following actions to help strengthen the nonproliferation regime and assure the long-term viability

of the NPT were recommended by various participants:

1. Significant and early progress by nuclear weapon states on nuclear arms limitation and reduction.

2. Full assurance of uninterrupted supply of nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful use to all NPT parties. It was hoped that the IAEA's Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) would make early progress on this point.

3. More adequate support of the IAEA from member nations to assure that it meets its dual responsibility of application of effective international safeguards and assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

4. Early agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Many participants believed this to be the most important action to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Trilateral discussions among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain in the context of the Committee on Disarmament have made little progress in the most recent meetings. It was suggested by some participants that the three nuclear weapon states give full attention to reaching early interim agreement on a CTB, and thereafter bring it to the attention of the other two nuclear weapon states and the full CD. Some participants believed that other measures should be considered to supplement and encourage trilateral movement toward an agreement. One suggestion was creation of an ad hoc working group of the CD to focus on financial and administrative arrangements for a seismic detection system.

5. A common formula for negative security assurances, perhaps included in a Security Council resolution. This guarantee could include assurances by nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear weapon state that has committed itself not to manufacture or receive nuclear weapons or explosive devices or to acquire control over them, so long as the state does not undertake or cooperate in an attack upon a nuclear

weapon state or its allies with the support of another nuclear weapon state. Some participants also noted that negative assurances could be included in a protocol to the NPT.

6. New measures to deal with regional security concerns of countries, either by strengthening existing security arrangements or developing new regional security agreements. This may include creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the strengthening of the existing zone in Latin America.
7. An additional protocol to the NPT, strengthening Article IV and VI requirements. Some participants strongly opposed any revision of the NPT.
8. A special convention to protect peaceful nuclear facilities and provide procedures for awarding damages and reparations.
9. Sanctions against nations which may violate the goals of the NPT and develop nuclear weapons.
10. A voluntary code of conduct between nuclear supplier and consumer countries regarding the transfer of nuclear material and equipment. Such an agreement should include a requirement of either *de jure* or *de facto* full-scope IAEA safeguards.

**International Atomic Energy Agency**

Most participants strongly supported the work of the IAEA and believed that it must expand its responsibilities in the future, both in the peaceful and safeguard aspects of nuclear energy. Among the areas mentioned by some participants as very important were nuclear plant safety and expanded technical assistance to developing countries. The agency's role may also expand in assurances of supply as the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply, which reports to the IAEA's Board of Governors, increases in the years ahead. An extremely important future role for the agency will be in connection with management and storage of plutonium and spent fuels. This may extend to IAEA management of regional or subregional nuclear centers involving sensitive portions of the fuel cycle.

Most participants also believed that the IAEA must strengthen and rationalize its safeguard procedures to remove doubts which have developed as the result of the Israeli attack on Iraq's reactor. In this regard it was noted that the IAEA administers non-NPT safeguards on specific facilities of member nations as well as *de jure* full-scope safeguards on NPT parties. Both kinds of safeguards are systems of accounting which detect diversion and therefore can serve as an important deterrent. The question as to whether the existing safeguard system provides sufficient advance warning of possible militarily significant diversion of materials remains controversial and unresolved. Continued emphasis should be given to enhancing the effectiveness of safeguards and that the IAEA should be supported and strengthened.

**1983 Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy**

Participants drew attention to the decision of the 35th UN General Assembly for the convening of the UN Conference for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in 1983. The conference will be political rather than technical. It will focus primarily on problems of assurances of supply of nuclear material with consideration given to other related issues including cooperative efforts in the nuclear fuel cycle, nonproliferation, and the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Most participants believed the 1983 conference will be highly important to the future of the nonproliferation regime.

The 1983 conference is in part a result of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) which concluded in February 1980. INFCE led to better understanding between nuclear supplier and consumer nations and provided an important breathing space for reflection on contentious nuclear issues. INFCE's conclusions did lend support to the view that nonproliferation is basically a political rather than a technical problem and that in the long run a multilateral rather than unilateral or bilateral approach to the problem will be most productive. INFCE led to the creation of CAS which will serve as an interim body for

post-INFCE supplier-consumer discussions until the 1983 conference. The Preparatory Committee for the conference, composed of 70 countries and assisted by the IAEA, will hold its formulative session in August 1981 in Vienna. The IAEA, through CAS, will provide technical information and assist in preparations for the conference. It was also noted that the IAEA will host, in the autumn of 1982, an international conference on technical, safety, and economic aspects of nuclear power which will provide useful input for the 1983 conference.

Participants urged that careful preparation be undertaken to assure full participation by all nations in the 1983 conference which is considered so vital to the future of the nonproliferation regime.

## Regional Multilateral Disarmament Efforts

Participants believed regional arms limitation and disarmament efforts are an important and promising area. Regional endeavors are more manageable due to the smaller number of states involved. Through cooperative regional efforts the area can be isolated from external entanglements, and issues can be resolved or managed. Approaches need to be tailored to fit the particular regional situation. There are many opportunities for indigenous regional efforts and some lessons can be drawn from approaches already successfully utilized.

Many participants emphasized the need for regional agreements in which nations would commit themselves to consult on a regular, periodic basis and to avoid destabilizing acts.

Some participants cautioned that regional efforts will be hindered by the lack of superpower progress in resolving East-West issues. Most participants, however, believed that superpower inaction on nuclear arms control should not be allowed to delay regional initiatives and that all opportunities should be explored. It was also observed that progress in certain regional areas could contribute to resolution of East-West conflict. Some participants also stressed the vital contribution of countries outside a region, particularly militarily significant and nuclear weapon states, in supporting regional efforts.

### European Arms Control

Europe was viewed as the highest priority for regional arms control efforts, because of the high concentration of nuclear and conventional weapons and troops and the possibility of East-West conflict originating in the region.

The Vienna-based talks on mutual (and balanced) force reductions have proceeded for many years with the objective of reducing forces in central Europe. Participants noted that there has been significant progress, including agreements on phases for force withdrawals. However, a number of issues remain, including questions of data (force levels), current political

problems in central Europe, and the fact that one major European nation (France) has not been part of the discussions. Most participants emphasized the need for both sides to undertake confidence-building measures to facilitate early progress.

Participants also noted the concern of many countries regarding long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe. These forces pose a significant threat of nuclear war and destruction. Participants welcomed the announcement by the United States that bilateral discussions on limiting and reducing these weapons should begin in late 1981.

Participants also expressed strong support for further implementation and assessment of the Helsinki Accords which resulted from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and which are being discussed at the current Madrid Conference. Some achievements have been made in bridging gaps between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on such issues as reunification of families and economic exchanges. The importance of avoiding polemical attacks and focusing on early progress toward European peace and security was emphasized by many participants.

There is a major remaining disagreement on proposals for a post-Madrid conference on European disarmament. France, with the support of NATO allies, has proposed a conference on disarmament in Europe which would have the objective of agreeing on obligatory and verifiable notifications of military maneuvers in Europe. The emphasis would be on confidence-building measures, an approach which conceptually converges with the mutual (and balanced) force reduction approach. The French proposal would apply to all of Europe including the European portion of the Soviet Union. Poland, on behalf of the Warsaw Pact, has proposed a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe which would exclude European Russia. Several nonaligned countries have offered proposals seeking to bridge the gap between the approaches of the two military blocs. Most participants emphasized that early agreement, before the Second Special Session on Disarmament,

on the framework for a post-Madrid European conference would be an important contribution to international peace and security.

### Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Zones of Peace

Most participants viewed nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace as a promising area for regional arms control, worthy of further study and support. The Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone established through the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 is the only successful zone in a major populated area.[3] Twenty-two Latin American states are parties to the agreement and members of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL). All nuclear weapon states have signed and ratified Protocol II by which they agree not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the agreement. The United States and France have signed, but not yet completed, ratification of Protocol I designed for states having territorial interests in the Americas.

In evaluating the success of the Latin American zone, participants noted the importance of a careful preparatory effort involving negotiations among all states in the region and consultation with all relevant nonregional countries with the objective of gaining their eventual support. Another attribute of the Latin American zone is its requirement of full-scope IAEA safeguards for nuclear activities of parties.

The Middle East was considered by many participants as a region which could uniquely benefit from creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. A resolution of the 35th UN General Assembly urged all parties in the region to take practical steps for implementing such a zone. All states in the region, including Israel, supported the resolution although that nation's recent attack on a nuclear installation may have imperiled the zone's creation. Some participants recommended as a first step that each Middle Eastern country make a unilateral declaration not to produce nuclear weapons.

Participants identified other regions including the Nordic area, South Asia, Africa, and East Asia as pos-

sible nuclear-weapon-free zones.[6] Each region faces complex obstacles which many felt would prevent early progress toward creation of a zone. However, several participants emphasized the importance of leadership by countries in the proposed region in emphasizing that a nuclear-weapon-free zone will promote national security.

Another approach discussed was the creation of zones of peace with the objective of limiting the military activities and forces of external states in the area. Primary attention has been focused on an Indian Ocean zone of peace, and some participants urged the United States and Soviet Union to resume discussions toward limiting their growing military presence in the region. Some participants noted the differing views among countries participating in the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, which has been undertaking preparatory work for a proposed international conference in 1981 in Sri Lanka.

Other areas which have been discussed as possible zones of peace are the Mediterranean and Southeast Asia (which has been supported by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]).[7]

Some participants also urged greater international attention to the limitation of conventional weapons development and transfers on a regional basis. The preliminary efforts undertaken in Latin America through the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho, supplemented by further discussions in 1978 and 1979, are a hopeful beginning, illustrating the need for initiatives originating in the region. Some participants also suggested that the Soviet Union and the United States should resume bilateral discussions, which might later include other arms producers, designed to control conventional arms transfers to specific regions.



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

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

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

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## Multilateral Disarmament Machinery

Most participants believed that the current multilateral disarmament machinery, much of which is the result of the First Special Session, is adequate and should not be supplemented by additional bodies. However, some suggested the current multilateral disarmament machinery includes too many meetings, documents, and procedures which may be impeding real disarmament progress. In order to streamline and simplify the multilateral disarmament process, better utilization and coordination of existing mechanisms were recommended. It was also suggested that maximum progress is often achieved through informal rather than formal discussions.

Some participants suggested that the existing machinery would produce more results if all nations would endeavor to accept modest achievements as first steps, avoid unrealistic demands that make agreement impossible, use restraint in promoting certain favored proposals, and appoint negotiators whose personalities and skills enable them to be effective in a negotiating situation.

To facilitate success in multilateral disarmament endeavors, many participants suggested the need for governments to strengthen their own disarmament machinery and correlate it with multilateral deliberative and negotiating mechanisms.

### Deliberative Bodies

1. *UN General Assembly*

   The Final Document of the First Special Session affirmed that the "General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament" – a view shared by participants. Since 1978, the General Assembly's First Committee, based on a decision of the First Special Session, has dealt exclusively with disarmament and related security matters. Most participants viewed this arrangement as desirable and would not recommend further changes. Some participants, however, criticized the increased number and repetitious nature of General Assembly disarmament resolutions

and urged that this trend be limited. The First Committee's focus, it was urged, should be on an annual review of disarmament and on stimulating action in areas ripe for progress.

2. *UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC)*
The First Special Session decided to revitalize the UN Disarmament Commission as a forum for deliberation of disarmament proposals when the UN General Assembly is not in session. The objective was to have a forum which might meet two times a year to complement the work of the First Committee and to consider disarmament proposals in greater depth. Participants observed that the UNDC has achieved some progress through adoption of elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament recommended to the CD and the elements of a draft resolution on Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.

However, many participants were critical of recent lack of substantive progress by UNDC and its tendency to duplicate the work of the First Committee. Some questioned the continued utility of the Commission. Many urged that it focus on a few specific disarmament items. Some participants also observed that the current international situation may have contributed to the Commission's recent inadequate results. Most urged a serious effort to make the Commission more effective and better coordinate its activities with the First Committee and the 1982 Special Session.

3. *Other*
The possibility of a World Disarmament Conference (WDC) or further Special Sessions on Disarmament was briefly discussed. It was observed that the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference continues to function and submit annual reports to the General Assembly. Based on its recommendations, some participants favored convening a World Disarmament Conference following the Second Special Session on Disarmament and after careful preparations. Other participants said that a World Disarmament Conference would exacerbate the existing problem of an excessive number of disarmament fora.

Some participants also favored additional UN General Assembly Special Sessions on Disarmament, although cautioning that they should not be institutionalized as this would limit their impact. It was proposed that future special sessions be scheduled by the General Assembly when and if a need becomes apparent, and should not be scheduled far in advance. Some participants suggested that future Special Sessions might focus on review and assessment of implementation of stages of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. These Special Sessions would review CPD progress and also identify near-term priorities.

**Negotiating Body: Committee on Disarmament**

Following the recommendation of the First Special Session, the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) was transformed into the Committee on Disarmament and the membership was increased from 31 to 35 nonnuclear weapon states plus the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Chairmanship is now rotated on a monthly basis. Work is conducted by consensus in two regular sessions and through four ad hoc working groups.

Participants identified several prime disarmament objectives for the CD prior to the Second Special Session on Disarmament:

1. Chemical weapons agreement. Most participants believed it unlikely that the United States and Soviet Union would reach final agreement prior to SSOD II. Considerable progress has been achieved but differences remain on the question of verification. It was recommended by some participants that the Soviet Union and United States prepare and submit a report to the Second Special Session on progress toward, and remaining obstacles to, final conclusion of a chemical weapons agreement. Some participants also stressed that more responsibility and a broader mandate should be given to the CD's ad hoc working group on chemical weapons, which is intended to play a role in achieving a multilateral agreement. It was suggested that the chairman of the ad hoc working group and other interested members might attend

the bilateral negotiations and could possibly be helpful.

2. Negative security guarantees. Many participants were hopeful that the CD could produce a common formula acceptable to both nuclear and nonnuclear weapon states prior to the Second Special Session. Participants believed this would be a significant achievement and could strengthen the nonproliferation regime. (See page 23, Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime.)

3. Comprehensive test ban. Most participants emphasized the importance of early agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. The trilateral negotiators were urged to make renewed efforts to reach agreement on the basic components of a CTB before SSOD II. If this is not possible, they were urged to prepare a complete report outlining areas of progress toward, and obstacles remaining to, final completion of a CTB. Some participants also urged the establishment of a CD ad hoc working group on a CTB due to lack of progress toward an agreement. (See page 23, Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime.)

4. Radiological weapons. A joint draft convention was submitted by the United States and Soviet Union in 1979. The CD has a working group on radiological weapons. Some participants strongly believed the CD should be able to reach final agreement on a radiological weapons treaty prior to SSOD II. A few participants questioned the narrow definition given radiological weapons and the fact that the agreement prohibits an undeveloped weapons system. Other participants stressed the importance of reaching an agreement because it would prohibit an as yet undeveloped weapons system before the technology advances. In addition the symbolic importance of achieving an East-West arms control agreement in the current international climate was pointed out.

5. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Some participants stressed the importance of the CD's working group achieving its assigned goal of the elaboration of a CPD in time for consideration

and adoption by SSOD II. The adoption of a CPD by SSOD II would, in this view, set an important pattern for future progress. Other participants believed the CPD is less important and that the CD should emphasize the negotiation of specific disarmament agreements. (See page 13, Second Special Session on Disarmament.)

Participants gave particular emphasis to improving the output of the CD including duration, quality and character of work, and level of representation.

Some participants stated that the CD's average annual meeting time of 20 weeks is insufficient time to discuss and negotiate disarmament agreements. Other negotiating bodies or special negotiations involving fewer parties meet for significantly longer periods of time. Some participants, while agreeing that increased duration could be useful, questioned whether it would contribute to greater progress. A few participants believed there is genuine merit in short CD meetings with adequate interim periods for internal consultation and development of positions.

Regarding the quality and character of the CD's work, many participants believed excessive time is wasted on procedures, with an insufficient amount dedicated to substantial negotiations. In this respect the achievements of the CCD, which successfully negotiated several treaties, were compared to the lack of progress by the CD. It was suggested that the CD simplify procedures, cut down on formal meetings and documentation, and use informal negotiating papers.

Other participants defended the emphasis on procedures as necessary in the early stages of the CD. Because the earlier CCD, it was suggested, had been closely controlled by the two superpowers, the CD's broadly acceptable rules and procedures are necessary to reflect its more representative membership. It was believed that with the procedures now established the CD should be able to focus more effectively on future negotiations.

Other ideas suggested by some participants for improving the quality of the CD's output included in-

creasing the term of service for chairmen of the ad hoc working groups (beyond the current one session). It was also suggested that the CD was becoming too oriented toward "group" operations (Group of 21, Socialist countries, Western countries) and that this was inhibiting progress.

Many participants recommended increasing the level of representation to the CD. It was noted that less than a third of the representatives to the CD have ambassadorial rank; the other members are represented by lower-level appointees. Many CD representatives also serve as ambassadors to other countries and organizations, limiting the amount of time which can be given to serious disarmament negotiations. Most participants strongly urged all countries to appoint high-level and exclusive representatives to the CD. It was also suggested that countries send experts on the various items under consideration to attend the complete sessions of the CD.

Some participants mentioned the need to enhance interaction between the CD (the negotiating body) and the First Committee of the General Assembly (the prime deliberative body). Other participants, while favoring better coordination between the two, pointed out that an existing problem is the amount of time CD negotiators must spend in New York and that methods must be devised to prevent this becoming an even greater difficulty.

Finally, most participants, while supporting the enhancement of the output and quality of CD work, emphasized that the real issue is the political will of the negotiating parties. Duration, procedures, and level of representation will be improved as the level of national interest in the CD's work is increased. The CD can function effectively and nations should utilize it to pursue serious negotiations.

**UN Disarmament Support Services**

1. *UN Centre for Disarmament*
   The UN Centre for Disarmament, part of the UN Secretariat (Department of Political and Security Council Affairs), was strengthened and reorganized following the First Special Session with a small increase in its budget. Most participants

praised the work of the Centre and believed it deserves greater financial support. Recommendations by some participants included greater emphasis by the Centre on public information on disarmament, including better coordination of activities with the UN's Office of Public Information. This would permit the Centre to produce and distribute more public information on disarmament in nations and particular regions. Some participants also questioned whether excessive attention was being given to support services for conferences and ongoing disarmament forums, given the limited personnel of the Centre.

2. *UN Institute for Disarmament Research*
Participants briefly discussed the work of the newly created UN Institute for Disarmament Research. Most believed it is doing useful work. Some suggested that the current organizational arrangement, with the Institute a part of the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), is not satisfactory and should be altered. Most participants believed that the future of the Institute, including its relationship with the Centre for Disarmament, should be carefully evaluated at the time of the Second Special Session.

3. *Expert Studies and Advisory Board*
Most participants were strongly supportive of the disarmament expert studies, many of which were stimulated as a result of the First Special Session. Many of the studies have already been productive, and participants suggested emphasis should now be given to distributing results to the general public in an understandable fashion. Most participants recommended that continued emphasis be given to carefully developed expert disarmament studies, employing the highest caliber international talent.

Some participants questioned the further utility of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies set up by the Secretary-General to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under UN auspices. Other participants believed the Advisory Board can continue to play an important role in better coordinating and organizing disarmament studies.

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

## Expanding the Disarmament Constituency[8]

The participants agreed that broad, well informed support for progress toward disarmament is highly important.

The potential constituency for disarmament includes all who would benefit, in both the public and private sectors of all countries. However, most citizens and governmental leaders need more information and motivation. Special efforts are needed to reach political and military decision makers and professional diplomats and to encourage them to use their influence and skills in the disarmament effort.

### Methods and Approach

There was general agreement that a substantial increase in education and information on disarmament and arms control is needed, and that this should be done through all available channels: governments, news media, universities, schools, NGOs, etc. Many participants urged that all nations permit an open two-way flow of information on all aspects of disarmament.

There was general agreement that publicity and information on disarmament must be accurate and credible. Information for the general public should be presented in interesting and understandable ways. UN expert studies on disarmament and other UN documents should be summarized and simplified for public presentation.

Many participants stressed the need to present disarmament issues to each group in a way that shows concern for the problems of that group. For example, in countries where many people want to reduce their taxes or increase their economic development, they should be shown how arms limitation and reduction will help achieve these objectives. Recent studies on the relationship between disarmament and development should be widely publicized.

Governmental officials responsible for defense planning should be shown how arms control and reduction can solve some of their problems while reducing both cost and risk. Realistic and balanced

disarmament measures will increase national security. Governments concerned about stability need information on the stabilizing effect of steps toward disarmament.

Several participants stressed the need to present information in ways that persuade rather than frighten. While the very real dangers of the arms race and the need for prompt action must be presented, an approach that implies unilateral disarmament or ignores security needs should be avoided.

**National Disarmament Organizations**

There was consensus on the need to strengthen governmental agencies dealing with disarmament and to create them in countries which do not yet have them. Their value in national policy formation and in research was pointed out.

A recent study by the Stanley Foundation identified five weaknesses in many national disarmament organizations and five corresponding steps which should be taken by governments to increase their effectiveness:

1. An increase in trained full-time professional disarmament staff.
2. Better integration of a disarmament perspective into national policy formulation and decision making.
3. An increased and regular legislative input into disarmament negotiations and policy formulation.
4. An increase in internally or externally commissioned disarmament research.
5. Improved disarmament information and education activities.[9]

Several participants praised the UN program of fellowships on disarmament which helps train personnel of national disarmament agencies, and reported that they are helpful in increasing the expertise of national staffs.

The importance of parliamentary involvement in national disarmament policies and the value of an active

national organization of parliamentarians concerned with this subject were stressed.

Several participants recommended more direct interaction between political leaders and defense officials on disarmament issues. National commissions on disarmament, with broad representation of the public and private sectors, were suggested.

**Nongovernmental Organizations**

Many participants emphasized the important contributions of NGOs and research institutes. However, there was concern because of the limited number of organizations actively engaged in education or research on disarmament. There is a need to involve more professional organizations and organizations with broad membership, provide them with information, and motivate them. The need for scientific and medical organizations to provide factual information on the probable effects of a nuclear war was noted.

Some participants suggested that NGOs should make a long-term commitment of support for ongoing disarmament progress rather than losing interest after one important treaty is ratified. Another recommendation was that NGOs should ponder their approach to be sure they are responding to the real concerns of the people and are not perceived as fringe movements or as advocates of unilateral disarmament.

The usefulness of governmental grants for specific NGO projects, such as sponsoring conferences, was noted.

**World Disarmament Campaign**

The proposed World Disarmament Campaign and fund were discussed briefly. The goal would be to mobilize public opinion in support of disarmament action through information and education. Some participants suggested that the campaign should be linked closely to the UN Centre for Disarmament, other UN agencies, and regional organizations. Others pointed out that the proposed campaign would have limited resources, and suggested that the campaign be concentrated in nations where military expenditures are high as a percentage of gross national product.

## Other Approaches to Disarmament and Security

There was consensus that in addition to the continuing effort to move toward disarmament through binding treaties and conventions, all other feasible approaches should be considered.

It was suggested that some of these methods may be useful as long-term measures or as interim steps or both. Less formal approaches may be particularly helpful as holding actions or supplements to negotiations, e.g., in preventing the production or development of new weapons technology while a treaty is being negotiated. However, many of these ideas may also have long-term value.

The participants' suggestions for a US-Soviet summit meeting, regular high-level consultations, and related confidence-building measures are discussed above. (See page 9, Disarmament Stalemate.)

### Independent Initiatives and Moratoriums

Independent initiatives could be taken by a nation or group of nations. These initiatives would not be conditioned on reciprocal action, but some degree of reciprocity would usually be necessary to keep the process going. For example, one small or temporary limitation or reduction of armaments could lead to a long series of reciprocal limitations or reductions.

Most participants referred to these measures as "independent initiatives," to avoid the negative implications of the word "unilateral" and to emphasize that several nations can take independent action, formally or informally.

Some participants recommended that recent proposals for significant nuclear arms reductions be implemented by a series of independent and reciprocal initiatives, including voluntary verification procedures. It was suggested that this approach could also be extended to conventional weapons, perhaps on a regional basis.

Moratoriums have sometimes been useful as interim steps. It was suggested that progress toward a CTB and a chemical warfare treaty might be aided by moratoriums.

### Nonbinding Norms and Informal Restraints

Two or more nations could informally accept an agreed set of nonbinding guidelines, without a binding treaty or as an interim measure while a treaty is being negotiated. Adherence would be voluntary. However, the guidelines could include a series of periodic reports on compliance, which would probably be an incentive for continuing compliance. Participants mentioned several situations in which this method has been used effectively, both within Europe and in UN bodies.

A suggested variation of this approach would be to make a list of useful disarmament and confidence-building measures and informally select one or more of them for a specified trial period (e.g., two years) with no formal agreement. Success with one measure would probably be followed by other trials, and some of them might lead to formal agreements. This approach is flexible and could be used on a global, regional, or bilateral basis.

### Other Confidence-Building Measures

Suggested confidence-building steps could include advance notification of planned military maneuvers and troop movements. This would allow observation of these events, and exchange of information on levels of weapons, forces, and military budgets. This approach has been used with some degree of success in Europe. Some participants suggested it is now necessary to increase "transparency" of national military information, determine how to obtain mutually acceptable data on weapons and forces, and agree on standardized reporting of military budgets. Others suggested that the existing measures be applied to a larger zone and to other regions.

Another form of confidence-building, strongly recommended by many participants, is a formal plan for regular, periodic, private dialogue or consultation. The agreed purpose might be one or more of the following: to discuss and ensure compliance with a specific arms control agreement; to resolve ambiguities or differing interpretations of an agreement; to enable each party to inform the other of anything that party is doing that causes fear or insecurity, and what that party could do to provide reasurrance; or to provide a regularly scheduled opportunity for infor-

mal dialogue on any subjects of mutual interest. Some participants said that the Soviet-US continuing consultative committee under the SALT agreements has worked reasonably well and noted that a similar method is proposed for a chemical weapons treaty.

Many participants emphasized the need to use established channels and fora even though their purpose is informal private discussion. This would assure periodic, scheduled opportunities for dialogue, and would avoid political problems related to deciding whether and when to meet.

Some participants pointed out the confidence-building value of all forms of continuing cooperation, such as economic relations and cultural exchanges.

**Improved Mechanisms for Peaceful Resolution of Controversies**

Many participants emphasized the vital importance of conflict management and dispute settlement in creating a favorable climate for disarmament. Others warned that disarmament cannot wait until the many international conflicts are settled, and that new disputes continue to erupt. Most participants accepted the view that disarmament and peaceful settlement of controversies are parallel processes, each of which aids the other, but that neither should be dependent on the other.

Several participants urged better implementation of the seven methods of peaceful settlement provided in Article 33 of the Charter. Others pointed out the difficulties of obtaining Security Council action.

One proposal was to strengthen the fact-finding process through the Security Council, so that a fact-finding mission could be sent quickly to the site of any international dispute. It was suggested that fact-finding should not be subject to the veto. Charter revision is not necessary to deal with this problem because the five permanent members of the Security Council could bind themselves by agreement not to exercise the veto in this situation.

Two proposals to strengthen the UN's conciliation capability were presented:

1. A standing Conciliation Commission was proposed. Various participants suggested that this commission should report to the Security Council but should have the authority to act quickly on its own initiative.

2. Another proposal would create an informal body of distinguished persons who would be available on a standby basis as conciliators. There would be an open list of respected conciliators, available at the request of the parties.

Some participants suggested that either or both methods could be used, but that the structure and procedures should be flexible and informal and the conciliators should be selected on an ad hoc basis.

**UN and Regional Verification Processes**

Most participants believed that further development of UN and regional verification capability for various kinds of agreements would be a positive step. Some participants said that improvement of verification methods is vital to future disarmament progress.

Some participants proposed to establish a small verification unit within the UN Centre for Disarmament, to be used for primary or supplemental verification of many arms control and disarmament agreements.

**UN and Regional Security Capability**

Many participants emphasized the close relationship between disarmament and international machinery to protect the security of nations as they reduce their armaments. Most participants agreed that disarmament, peaceful settlement of disputes, and international security and peacekeeping measures are all needed and should proceed on parallel tracks.

Some participants urged renewed emphasis on peacekeeping forces, both within the United Nations and in various regions. Many nations have trained some of their armed forces for peacekeeping duty, and it was proposed that more nations do so. Some of the countries with experience in UN peacekeeping are able and willing to work with the United Nations and regional organizations to provide staff and support personnel for peacekeeping forces.

It was suggested that disarmament will necessarily be a gradual process, and that process should include the transformation of national armed forces into international peacekeeping forces.

## Footnotes

1. *United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament,* Report of the Twelfth United Nations Procedures Conference, May 1-3, 1981, sponsored by the Stanley Foundation. This conference considered SSOD II in greater detail.
2. Ibid. This report includes many specific suggestions on preparation for SSOD II and on the role of NGOs.
3. Ibid.
4. *Nonproliferation: 1980s,* Vantage Conference Report, January 29-February 3, 1980, sponsored by the Stanley Foundation. Nonproliferation is considered in much greater depth.
5. See Alfonso García Robles, *The Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.* Occasional Paper 19, Stanley Foundation, May 1979.
6. William Epstein, *A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Africa?* and Roderic Alley, *Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: The South Pacific Proposal.* Occasional Paper 14, Stanley Foundation, May 1977.
7. Ibid.
8. *United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament* includes other proposals for enlarging the disarmament constituency.
9. L.M. Ross and John R. Redick, *National Disarmament Mechanisms: A Research Study of the Stanley Foundation,* July 1980.

Stanley Foundation publications are available free of charge upon request.

Yankov

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# OPENING REMARKS



C. Maxwell Stanley
Conference Chairman

THE MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT PROCESS

Our purpose this week is to discuss the multilateral approach to disarmament and to identify the ways that nations of the world may cooperate not just to limit but, more importantly, to reduce national armaments and thereby to lessen the chances of war and enhance security.

The ever-escalating arms race jeopardizes rather than benefits participating nations and the world community. Neither the pyramiding arsenals of nuclear warheads nor the expanding divisions, fleets, and squadrons armed with conventional weapons provide genuine security.

Nearly $600 billion (US) are now expended annually on armaments; funds sorely needed for economic and social purposes. Enormous scientific and technological resources are focused on the creation of weapons to better exterminate people, devastate cities, threaten human survival, and destroy civilization. Meanwhile, research pertaining to serious issues affecting the quality of life – food, energy, development, and environmental protection – suffers from inadequate attention and funding.

The ever-present threat and the frequent use of military force separate peoples by strengthening long-standing fears, prejudices, and hatreds, and thus undermine the cooperation that is essential to disarmament progress.

The national leaders who make the decisions that accelerate the arms race do so in the name of peace and security; they would not dare claim otherwise. But the security provided by the arms race is illusory and the arms race itself is senseless and hazardous. The urgency of limiting and reducing national armaments is broadly recognized, as indicated by the following quotation from the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD I) of the UN General Assembly:

> Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation.

The arms race rolls on despite this recognition and the numerous warnings from wise and far-seeing people about the futility of war fought with modern weapons. How are we to put shackles on the arms race, the gigantic, inanimate monster with its own powerful life thrust? Have we the wisdom and the determination to break with tradition and respond to George Kennan's recent call to preserve ourselves from committing the supreme and final folly?

## The Multilateral Role

Because of the crucial importance of checking and reversing the nuclear arms race, the world community for two decades has been tolerably agreeable to place

primary responsibility for arms reduction on the major nuclear weapon powers – the United States and the Soviet Union – and to urge them to get on with the task of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons. This has resulted in an unhealthy domination of the world community's largely ineffective disarmament efforts by these two countries.

Beginning in the early 1960s, the two superpowers sparred with each other over disarmament matters and each adopted important arms control measures aimed at stabilizing mutual nuclear deterrence. In 1967, they began serious negotiations that led to the 1972 SALT I Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Subsequently, they negotiated the ill-fated SALT II Treaty. Their bilateral negotiations are now at a stalemate.

From 1962 until 1979, the nuclear giants, as co-chairmen, dominated the disarmament negotiations of the Geneva-based Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Most of the treaties produced by the CCD, particularly the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), reflect their ideas. The European negotiations for mutual force reductions have likewise been dominated by the nuclear powers.

More recently, the world community, urged by the nonaligned nations, has emphasized the multilateral approach to disarmament. In 1978, the First Special Session on Disarmament of the UN General Assembly, the largest and highest level disarmament conference ever convened, adopted a Final Document incorporating important principles of disarmament, a Programme of Action, and proposals for revising UN disarmament machinery. Subsequently, the CCD was transformed into a 40-nation Committee on Disarmament (CD) that now includes all nuclear weapon states. The UN Disarmament Commission was reactivated; support for the UN Centre for Disarmament was increased; a UN Institute for Disarmament Research was established; and a UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament was instituted.

The multilateral approach to disarmament is the result of a growing recognition that disarmament is too

important to be left to the major nuclear powers. Confidence in their concept of peace based on mutual terror – mutual assured destruction – is waning. Numerous regional conventional arms races need to be curtailed. Despite increasing multilateral emphasis, however, the results so far have been only documentation and rhetoric. Not a plane, a tank, nor a ship has been deactivated. Hence, the timeliness of our conference topic: The Multilateral Disarmament Process.

## Second Special Session on Disarmament

At our recent Twelfth United Nations Procedures Conference, I made the following observations concerning SSOD II:

1. SSOD II must advance beyond SSOD I. There is no need to repeat the rhetoric and debate related to the disarmament principles of the Final Document.
2. SSOD II should set the stage for early actions which advance the disarmament process and result in the limitation or reduction of both conventional and nuclear armaments.
3. SSOD II's success will be enhanced by stimulating the renewal and expansion of bilateral negotiations to reduce nuclear armaments.
4. SSOD II's success will be enhanced if it develops a stronger conceptual linkage between disarmament progress and national security.
5. SSOD II will be judged partly by its success in expanding the worldwide constituency supporting disarmament.

There is, I believe, a need to clarify SSOD II's objectives. Undoubtedly, both near-term measures and a comprehensive program of disarmament will be considered. Near-term priority actions consistent with a long-range plan are needed. It would seem, therefore, that a dual or two-track approach would be desirable.

By strengthening the linkage between arms reduction and national security, SSOD II could debunk the myth that ever-increasing armaments provide greater security. A further challenge to SSOD II planning is to

provide for greater input and participation by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and research institutes.

## Nonproliferation and the Multilateral Process

Because an effective nonproliferation regime is crucial to stop and reverse the nuclear arms race, it is an item of importance to all nations, not just those possessing or about to possess nuclear weapons.

The objectives of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remain valid. More nuclear buttons within the reach of more hands further destabilize the present nuclear balance of terror. More sources of plutonium without proper safeguards increase the probability of nuclear theft and terrorism. More nuclear installations of whatever type multiply the potential for accidents. The multilateral interest in an effective nonproliferation regime is understandably increasing.

NPT, the brainchild of the Soviet Union and the United States, is in jeopardy. Failure of the Second NPT Review Conference in 1980 to adopt the final statement is indicative of the situation. Many nations which ratified the NPT are challenging the Soviet Union and the United States to live up to their commitments under Articles IV and VI of the Treaty. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) brought together representatives of over 50 nations to study technical aspects of the use, processing, and management of nuclear fuels. This multilateral initiative undoubtedly has contributed to a better understanding of the problems involved in developing an effective nonproliferation regime.

A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTB) prohibiting all tests of nuclear explosives would help limit proliferation and is generally considered an important disarmament priority. Multilateral pressure is needed to encourage the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain to agree on the text of this treaty and to submit it to the Committee on Disarmament for adoption and for recommendation to the General Assembly.

Another multilateral organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), needs to be strengthened to undertake the increasingly important roles of applying the safeguards that are an essential part of a viable, nonproliferation regime, as well as providing assistance in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The 1983 UN Conference on the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy will provide another opportunity for multilateral efforts to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the context of equitable sharing of the benefits of nuclear energy.

## Regional Multilateral Efforts

The opportunities for nations to work together towards disarmament has a regional as well as a global dimension. The long-standing Mutual Force Reduction (MFR) negotiation between the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations is one such effort. Recently, neutral and nonaligned countries at the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe proposed a conference on confidence-building measures and disarmament. Despite the regional nature of the negotiations to limit and reduce the heavy European armaments, negotiations to date have been heavily influenced by the US-USSR confrontation. Nevertheless, the negotiations are multilateral, thereby affording opportunities for input that have not been present in the Soviet-American nuclear negotiations. A breakthrough in the limitation and reduction of European armaments is crucial for the entire disarmament effort.

One outstanding example of the regional approach is the Tlatelolco Treaty that prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons in Latin America. Contiguous nations have multilaterally agreed to make Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free zone. By means of protocols, nuclear weapon states outside the area covered by the Tlatelolco Treaty have agreed — or will have when the United States and France ratify Protocol No. 1 — to respect the terms of the treaty and to refrain from testing, producing, storing, or using nu-

clear weapons within Latin America and also to refrain from the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones have been proposed for many other areas, including sub-Saharan Africa, Scandinavia, Central Europe, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.

Nations of a region may also multilaterally negotiate arrangements to limit conventional armaments, to reduce arms transfer, and to prohibit the placement of certain types of sophisticated military equipment. Agreements of this type would be most likely in areas that have comparatively low levels of armaments and military standing and that are free from bitter ongoing controversy. The 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho by eight Latin American countries, followed by further discussions in 1978 and 1979, is a hopeful beginning.

Proposals for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean is another example of a regional approach to disarmament. Such a zone would involve not only adjacent nations but also the United States and the Soviet Union who would be asked to refrain from establishing bases in the area. Unfortunately, current events do not favor a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean area.

Regional multilateral disarmament efforts deserve careful study and encouragement. Wherever they can be developed, they will enhance security, reduce military budgets, lessen tensions, and thus benefit the countries involved.

National officials should place the regional approach high on their disarmament agenda. Multilateral regional commissions are needed for ongoing deliberation and negotiation. Statesmen within the area are needed to provide strong leadership.

## Multilateral Disarmament Capability

How may the world community enhance the multilateral disarmament process? One way is to improve existing mechanisms. As a result of SSOD I, the deliberative bodies of the United Nations now consist of

the General Assembly, including its First Committee and the resurrected UN Disarmament Commission. By action of SSOD I, the Committee on Disarmament, which is related to the United Nations but not an agency of it, serves as the negotiating body. These mechanisms provide an adequate framework for the multilateral disarmament process on the global level. Undoubtedly, their procedures and methods of operation can be improved to enhance multilateral capability.

The UN Centre for Disarmament and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, organizations that support the deliberative and negotiating bodies, need to be strengthened. Unquestionably, their capability would be improved by greater financial support that would permit more adequate staff. No doubt, some procedural changes would also be beneficial.

The multilateral process would be enhanced by vastly increased research and study on the many facets related to disarmament. Expert studies by appointed groups are increasingly being used. Can they be made more effective by recruiting more qualified experts or by modifying procedures? Would not a substantial continuing effort to develop a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament be useful? Would subsequent Special Sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament be useful, or would they tend to duplicate and overlap the work of the Disarmament Commission? Are there other ways in which the world community's disarmament capability may be enhanced?

## Expanding Disarmament Constituency

Disarmament is too important to be left solely to elected or self-appointed governmental leaders. The people who bear the burden of armament costs and suffer the casualties when arms races result in war need to be involved. Governmental leaders are more likely to develop the requisite will and determination to make disarmament progress if supported by a substantial constituency. Unfortunately, the worldwide constituency supporting disarmament is grossly inadequate.

Strengthening the multilateral process, therefore, depends in part on a larger, better informed constituency within national governments and the general public. Apathy needs to be overcome. It is not enough to view disarmament as a desirable objective; the complications and difficulties of achieving it must be recognized. The public needs disarmament information. The relationship between disarmament and national security needs to be explained; the economic advantages of smaller national budgets for military establishments need to be publicized. International and national disarmament organizations need to do a better job of publicizing disarmament matters – progress as well as setbacks. The UN information services can be helpful. The disarmament organizations of most governments must be expanded and strengthened, not only to better cope with the many complicated problems involved in disarmament but also to better inform their public.

Greater NGO and research organization involvement is highly desirable, both to build constituencies and to make meaningful contributions to disarmament deliberations. The privileges extended to NGOs and research institutes at SSOD I should be repeated and, in addition, arrangements should be made to provide them greater and earlier input. Beyond this, NGOs can do much to inform the public and thus broaden the disarmament constituency.

The World Disarmament Campaign now being studied by the United Nations is a potential vehicle for enlarging the disarmament constituency. Disarmament progress would also be enhanced by more adequate and accurate reporting by news media. What steps might be taken to improve media coverage? How may reporters and commentators become better informed on disarmament matters? Are there other ways in which the disarmament constituency may be expanded?

## Other Approaches

Early breakthroughs and successes would improve the climate for disarmament. Is it not desirable, therefore, to consider ways of breaking away from the conventional approach to disarmament that channels minds into the traditional pattern of formal negotiation and ratification of treaties and conventions? This

process is so slow and laborious that weapons' technology, development, and deployment outpaces it by a wide margin. Some alternatives to this traditional approach are:

1. Nonbinding norms or codes in the areas of arms races and security that could facilitate subsequent treaty negotiations or serve as guidelines for national conduct.
2. Agreed short-term moratoriums such as were used in negotiating the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963.
3. Independent initiatives undertaken by one nation or a group of nations in the expectation of reciprocal action.
4. Voluntary acceptance of informal restraints related to nonbinding norms or codes or to unratified treaties.

Confidence-building measures of various types that might reduce tensions could do much to decrease the danger of war by miscalculation and to improve the climate for disarmament. Development of improved verification systems capable of detecting compliance or noncompliance with agreed disarmament measures would strengthen confidence. What other confidence-building measures should be proposed?

Finally, it is important to recognize that substantial disarmament will not be achieved without simultaneous progress in the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict management. Few nations will appreciably reduce armaments until they are satisfied that international mechanisms are adequate in these two areas. Mechanisms that will assure the peaceful resolution of controversies that inevitably arise among nations and their nationals are needed. Also needed is the international capacity to deter imminent aggression and to deal effectively with breaches of the peace. These mechanisms are essential, even at the risk of encroaching on national sovereignty. Procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict management, together with disarmament, are the three interlocking elements of a security system for a world without war. All three depend upon multilateral agreement.

## Conclusion

Recently, George F. Kennan, historian, professor emeritus, and former US ambassador, addressed a bold and startling challenge to the United States and the Soviet Union to make an immediate across-the-board reduction of 50 percent of their nuclear arsenals. As he accepted the Albert Einstein Peace Prize he said:

> We have gone on piling weapon upon weapon, missile upon missile, new levels of destructiveness upon old ones. We have done this helplessly, almost involuntarily: like the victims of some sort of hypnotism, like men in a dream, like lemmings heading for the sea, like the children of Hameln marching blindly along behind their Pied Piper. And the result is . . . quantities of these weapons so vastly in excess of any rational and demonstrable requirements, redundancy of such grotesque dimensions as to defy rational understanding.

Kennan went on to say:

> What is it then . . . that has brought us to this pass? The answer, I think, is clear. It is primarily the inner momentum, the independent momentum, of the weapons race itself – the compulsions that arise and take charge of great powers when they enter upon a competition with each other in the building up of major armaments of any sort. . . .
>
> Is it possible to break out of this charmed and vicious circle? It is sobering to recognize that no one, at least to my knowledge, has yet done so. But no one, for that matter, has ever been faced with such great catastrophe, such inalterable catastrophe, at the end of the line. Others, in earlier decades, could befuddle themselves with dreams of something called "victory." We, perhaps fortunately, are denied this seductive prospect. We have to break out of the circle. We have no other choice.

While Kennan's challenge is aimed at the United States and the Soviet Union, it hits every nation that trusts in the threat and use of force to assure peace and security. The world must break out of the circle. We have no other choice.

# Chairman's Observations

These observations were prepared by the chairman, C. Maxwell Stanley, following the conference. They reflect discussion, not only at this conference, but also at prior Stanley Foundation conferences.

A well-organized conference, a fine group of able and concerned participants, and a good rapporteurs' report, but to what end? Feelings of fear, frustration, and anger mingle as I reflect on our deliberations on the multilateral approach to disarmament.

My fears grow as I contemplate the mounting dangers inherent in expanding arsenals of nuclear weapons, the proliferation of these means of mass destruction, and the burgeoning conventional military forces. These trends, together with the readiness of nations to resort to armed conflict, constantly increase the probability of disaster.

My frustrations deepen as I reflect on the current disarmament stalemate. Our Bermuda participants know what must be done to check and reverse the arms race; the rapporteurs' report provides a full agenda of action. But disarmament deliberations continue to focus on the procedural rather than the substantive, on words and documents rather than on the actual limitation and reduction of armaments, the increased use of peaceful settlement, and the other measures required to assure international peace and security.

I become angry as I recognize the shortsightedness of the leaders of nations, certainly including my own, who, believing that greater arsenals will assure peace and security, relentlessly stimulate the arms race. When will the leaders of nations awaken to the senseless risks they take as they procrastinate on disarmament? When will they realize the security and economic benefits to be gained by limiting and reducing armaments? What is needed to persuade or shock them into action?

## Breakthrough

There are no easy answers to these questions. Neither the forthcoming Second Special Session on Disarmament nor the laborious negotiations of the Committee on Disarmament are likely soon to bring appreciable disarmament progress. Without strong and determined leadership, SSOD II will do little more than produce additional documentation. The pace of multilateral negotiations will scarcely keep up with the development of new weapons technology. Therefore, it is important to experiment with alternative approaches: independent initiatives, moratoriums, nonbinding norms, and informal restraints – all discussed in the rapporteurs' report. Accompanied by confidence-building measures and improved international mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes and security measures, such approaches just might allow breakthroughs.

There will be no breakthroughs, however, unless the leaders of nations bring them about. Multilateral disarmament progress depends on a coalition of like-minded nations determined to achieve results. A coalition for survival, consisting of nonaligned nations and some countries from the NATO and Warsaw Pact groups, could stimulate disarmament action and exert strong pressure on the superpowers and other holdouts.

The world impatiently awaits the example and leadership of the major nuclear powers; undoubtedly they hold the key to disarmament progress. Next week is none to soon to resume the bilateral negotiating process. Next month is none too soon for President Brezhnev and President Reagan to meet to discuss bold objectives and, through moratoriums or joint initiatives, to make disarmament progress a reality. Meanwhile, the world rushes pell-mell to enlarge its capacity to destroy itself. Survival is at stake.

# Stanley Foundation Information

## Activities

The Stanley Foundation encourages study, research, and education in the field of international policy contributing to a secure peace with freedom and justice. Programming reflects founder and President C. M. Stanley's long-time concern for global security. Stanley Foundation activities include the following conferences and publications:

**Strategy for Peace Conference.** Meeting in small discussion groups, some 80 opinion-shapers and decision-makers explore US foreign policy concerns and recommend actions and policies.

**United Nations of the Next Decade Conference.** Convened alternately in the United States and abroad, this annual conference brings together 25 ambassadors, secretariat officials, foreign ministry officials, and international experts from the private sector to consider UN problems and prospects.

**United Nations Procedures Conference.** Current UN concerns and organizational procedures are examined by 25 diplomats, secretariat officials, and academic specialists at informal discussion sessions.

**Vantage Conferences.** A wide variety of multilateral and bilateral policy matters are frankly discussed by closely involved experts on an intermittent basis.

**Occasional Papers.** Policy-oriented essays by diverse authors are published periodically as Occasional Papers. These papers concern improvement of international organization or specific US foreign policy issues. Manuscript submissions are invited.

**World Press Review.** This monthly magazine excerpts and reprints material from the press outside the United States. Sold by subscription from World Press Review, 230 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10169.

The Stanley Foundation, a private operating foundation, does not provide grants. Conference reports and Occassional Papers are distributed free of charge. A publications list is available.

## United Nations of the Next Decade

In 1945, representatives of 50 nations signed the United Nations Charter in San Francisco "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights...to promote social progress...to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security."

Twenty years later delegates from 114 nations convened in San Francisco to commemorate that event. Upon the eve of that symbolic session, C. Maxwell Stanley gathered respected individuals from 13 nations to discuss the role of the United Nations in the next decade.

Since 1967, similar United Nations of the Next Decade conferences have assembled annually under Stanley Foundation sponsorship. Conference conclusions and recommendations are presented in a conference report which is distributed worldwide.

The selection of conference topics and the high quality of participants have produced recommendations which have been of value to governments and to the United Nations.

Conference sites have been selected to reflect the international dimension of this conference series and to promote personal relationships so important to mutual understanding.

1965 San Francisco, California, USA
1967 Burgenstock, Switzerland
1968 Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia
1969 Quebec, Canada
1970 Fredensborg, Denmark
1971 Sinaia, Romania
1972 South Egremont, Massachusetts, USA
1973 Amalfi, Italy
1974 Vail, Colorado, USA
1975 Baden bei Wien, Austria
1976 Charlottesville, Virginia, USA
1977 San Juan del Rio, Mexico
1978 Iowa City, Iowa, USA
1979 Porvoo, Finland
1980 Woodstock, Vermont, USA
1981 Warwick, Bermuda